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Abstract 
The study of secession generally stresses the causal influence of cultural identities, political 
preferences or ecological factors. Whereas these different views are often considered to be mutually 
exclusive, this paper proposes a two-stage model in which they are complementary. We posit that 
cultural identities matter for explaining secessionism, but not because of primordial attachments. 
Rather, religious and linguistic groups matter because their members are imbued with cultural 
legacies that lead to distinct political preferences over welfare statism. Further, ecological constraints 
such as geography and topography affect social interaction with like-minded individuals. On the basis 
of both these political preferences and ecological constraints, individuals then make rational choices 
about the desirability of secession. Instrumental considerations are therefore crucial in explaining the 
decision to secede, but not in a conventional pocketbook manner. To examine this theory, we 
analyze the 2013 referendum on the secession of the Jura Bernois region from the canton of Berne in 
Switzerland, using municipal level census and referendum data. The results lend support to the 
theory and suggest one way in which the politics of identity, based on factors like language and 
religion, can be fused with the politics of interest (preferences for more or less state intervention 
into the polity and economy) to better understand group behavior.  
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Secession is a phenomenon that affects both the developing countries (e.g., Georgia, China, Russia, 
Ukraine, Nigeria) as well as developed ones (e.g., Spain, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Italy; Dion, 
1996; Sorens, 2012). In several European democracies, like the United Kingdom and Spain (Muñoz 
and Guinjoan, 2013; Muñoz and Tormos, 2014), secessionist demands are accompanied by calls for a 
referendum to decide the question once and for all. In others, such as France, Belgium, and Italy, 
secession is at least sporadically invoked in political discourse when demanding more territorial 
group rights or fewer payments to poorer areas (Lindsey, 2012; Coppieters and Huysseune, 2002).  
Despite these developments in European politics, scholars continue to disagree over the 
relative importance of different mechanisms for understanding secession. Some argue that cultural 
factors, such as emotions, affect, and social identity, are key to explaining nationalism and 
separatism (e.g. Smith, 1986; Connor, 1994; Petersen, 2002), whereas others think that they can best 
be understood in terms of rational action (e.g. Buchanan and Faith, 1987; Wittman, 1991; Bolton and 
Roland, 1997; Bookman, 1992; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Sorens, 2012). Still others emphasize 
structural constraints on individual decision-making through geographically constrained social 
networks (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Jenkins, 1986; Rutherford et al., 2014). Thus whereas some 
scholars see secession as largely a matter of the heart, some see it as structurally determined, and 
others have given pride of place to the head in making such decisions.  
In this article, we contend that neither cultural, rational nor structural approaches by 
themselves are sufficient to account for secession. Consistent with research in historical 
institutionalism (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992; Steinmo, 2008; Katznelson and Weingast, 
2005), we conceptualize these explanations as inextricably linked. Specifically, we argue that whereas 
a cultural logic can account for the origin of political preferences, and structural approaches explain 
the constraints on decision-making, rational accounts can predict how actors behave when attending 
to these preferences in the face of ecological constraints. A more complete understanding of the 
determinants of separatism thus requires taking all of these logics seriously. The theory presented 
here stipulates that cultural identities matter by shaping political preferences for more or less 
statism, which in turn informs voting behavior on secession together with ecological factors. Hence, 
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we identify one (but not the only) possible mechanism by which cultural identity influences 
secessionism through its effect on political preferences for statism (cf. Sorens, 2012). By statist 
political preferences, we mean preferences pertaining to the general purpose of government, 
ranging from only minimal interventionism to maximal provision of public goods (Mitchell, 1991). By 
ecological factors, we are referring primarily to arguments that discuss how geography and 
topography shape social networks, information flow, collective action and decision-making (Jenkins, 
1986). 
To test these claims while accounting for alternative explanations, we analyze the results of a 
referendum held on 24 November 2013 in the Swiss region of Jura Bernois. The vote concerned 
whether this region with some 50,000 largely French-speaking and Protestant inhabitants should 
leave Canton Berne (a largely German-speaking and Protestant entity with 900,000 inhabitants) to 
join Canton Jura (a predominantly French-speaking and Catholic entity with 70,000 inhabitants). 
Although the secession of that region from Berne canton was eventually defeated (72% against vs. 
28% in favor), the referendum results exhibited considerable variation across the 49 municipalities 
with a spread of more than 50% points (from 2% up to 54% in favor). 
The next section examines existing theories that might help us to explain variation in the 
vote on secession, and then presents our own theory. We then apply these reflections to the 
situation at hand and explain our case selection. Next, we present our methods and data, and discuss 
the main findings. The final section concludes with some general implications and avenues for 
further research. 
 
Theory 
The large literature on secession can be usefully divided into three main approaches. The first is a 
culturalist approach that emphasizes the role of shared values in shaping political behavior (Almond 
and Verba, 1965; Smith, 1986; Connor, 1994). On this account, Dutch-speakers (e.g. in Flanders) 
should want to live with and be ruled by other Dutch-speakers, and Catholics (e.g. in Northern 
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Ireland) should aim for the same. The implication is that individuals prefer to be ruled by natives 
rather than by cultural aliens (Hechter, 2013). Moreover, people tend to carry these supposedly 
immutable identities with them when they move, at least in the short run, rather than adapting to 
their new cultural context (Connor, 1994). Thus, the immigration of people with a specific cultural 
background may influence the strength of a particular cultural marker, thereby shaping the demand 
for separation or unification on the basis of that identity. 
The second approach is rationalist. Researchers in this tradition typically focus on the 
economic consequences of secession for individuals (e.g. Buchanan and Faith, 1987; Wittman, 1991; 
Bolton and Roland, 1997; Bookman, 1992; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Nadeau et al., 1999). Another 
rationalist stream of research asserts that the relative position of groups in the stratification system 
privileges certain social identities over others (Hechter, 1978; Horowitz, 1985; Wimmer, 2002; 
Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). Thus, when a cultural group is relegated to a subordinate 
position in the stratification and political systems, this affects its members’ life chances, thereby 
intensifying the political salience of the cultural marker that is associated with their subordination. 
When full inclusion appears unlikely or cannot be offered credibly, the subordinate group may 
demand more self-rule (Sorens, 2012). 
The last approach is structuralist. Some of these accounts are based on the idea that the 
social networks that facilitate collective action are fundamentally constrained by geographic factors, 
such as distance and topography (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan and Urwin, 1983; Jenkins, 1986; 
Rutherford et al., 2014). For example, the greater the distance from a center to its peripheries, “the 
greater the risk that these will become the nuclei of independent center formation” (Rokkan and 
Urwin, 1983, p. 16), hence the looser the bonds that tie the two together and the more likely 
secession is to occur. Whatever their origin may be, social networks may promote in-group altruism 
that fosters collective action (but see Simpson et al., 2014 for some disconfirming evidence). 
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These three explanations – cultural, rational, and structural – are all plausible but incomplete 
accounts for secession.1 Why, for instance, do people who share multiple cultural identities (each of 
which might become politically relevant) emphasize one over another when a choice is required? The 
Swiss case presents us with a situation in which people are deciding whether to remain a linguistic 
minority or to become a linguistic majority but a religious minority. Cultural logic seems unable to 
specify which of these different identities serves as the basis for political identification and decision-
making. Nor can a cultural approach easily explain why a group’s linguistic identity trumps its 
religious identity in some situations but not in others, or why there is a change in political salience 
over time and in different contexts, or when multiple identities might be mutually reinforcing rather 
than cross-cutting or conflicting. The problem is that most studies of ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
conflict take the existence of cultural differences for granted. However, since individuals almost 
always possess multiple social identities (e.g. Roccas and Brewer, 2002; Simmel, 1955), this practice 
is questionable and the assumption of cultural differences that matter politically must itself be 
explained (Posner, 2004). Moreover, the mechanism of cultural homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin 
and Cook, 2001; Simpson et al., 2014) may not be the only, or the most important, reason for the 
political effects of cultural identities: to have an effect, cleavages also need to be activated by 
political entrepreneurs (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan and Urwin, 1983).  
Rationalist approaches suffer from their own shortcomings. First, all rationalist analyses take 
cultural identities for granted, treating them as exogenous to their explanatory apparatus, even 
though such identities are themselves the product of other processes and factors and may change 
over time and contexts. Second, although rationalists typically assume that the demand for secession 
emanates primarily out of instrumental – i.e. economic – considerations (Sambanis and Milanovic, 
                                                          
1 A fourth school of thought is institutional. Certain institutional arrangements reinforce certain 
identities (e.g., Slezkin, 1994) at the expense of other (non-institutionalized) identities, but we do not 
cover this approach here because all entities in the Swiss case have – at least formally – the same 
basic arrangement (local and cantonal autonomy), and thus this approach cannot account for the 
sub-national variation observed here, though it may be applicable in other settings.  
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2014), sometimes pocketbook issues play a minor role (Toft, 2012, p. 586). As Horowitz (1985, p. 
237) notes, in some cases “the decision to secede is taken despite the economic costs it is likely to 
entail” (emphasis added; cf. Loveman, 1998). Finally, although structural constraints such as distance 
and topography affect network formation, and limit the choices available to individuals, there is no 
warrant to believe that they are the sole or main determinants of political behavior, for individuals in 
similar structural positions can – and often do – exhibit disparate behavior.  
We argue that these approaches require integration, since culture explains the origin of 
political preferences; spatial features such as topography and distance shape interaction 
opportunities, thereby reinforcing or undercutting preference homogeneity; and rationality explains 
the choices made on the basis of the resulting preferences. Figure 1 depicts this framework 
schematically.  
 
Figure 1: Two–Stage Theoretical Model 
 
At the left of the figure are cultural legacies (or what Bourdieu, 1977, terms habitus), which 
we hypothesize shape political preferences. These legacies comprise the lifestyle, values, dispositions 
and expectations of particular social groups that are acquired through the activities and experiences 
of everyday life (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Talhelm et al., 2014).2 For 
example, it has long been appreciated that some religious groups have more individualistic values, 
whereas others are more collectivist (Durkheim, 1951; Davis and Robinson, 2012). Collectively-
oriented religions, such as Catholicism, tend to view the state as a vehicle that has a moral 
responsibility to protect the most vulnerable members of society. In general, Catholics generally have 
                                                          
2 For excellent examples of legacy-based arguments, see Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci (2015); 
Charron and Lapunte (2013); Darden and Gryzmala-Busse (2006); Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski 
and Toka (2009); Kopstein and Wittenberg (2011); Peisakhin (2015); Pop-Eleches (2007); Pop-Eleches 
and Joshua Tucker (2011); Shefter (1977, 1994); Wittenberg (2006; 2015). 
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a greater taste for redistributive welfare policies, and for a moralistic foreign policy, than Protestants 
(Castles, 1994). By contrast, more individualistic religions, like many Protestant denominations, 
emphasize hard work and individual responsibility, which they believe promotes independence and 
self-reliance, over state-provided welfare. It follows that the resulting policies from this tradition 
favor equality of opportunity over redistribution.3 
However, religion is far from the only source of political preferences. Language groups may 
also confer specific political preferences. Consider the two relevant languages in our empirical 
analysis: German and French. It is widely appreciated that France has a much stronger tradition of 
statism and centralization than Germany, a federal country with ample regional differences in 
wealth, dialect and history. By the same token, francophone areas of bi-national states such as 
Belgium are often more left-leaning than their English- or Dutch-speaking counterparts, which helps 
to explain why the Socialists are the major party in Wallonia but not in Flanders (Deschouwer, 2009, 
pp. 127–32). Similarly, “Quebecers’ collective identity is defined around specific political values 
mostly associated to the left of the political spectrum” (Caron, 2013, p. 222). In Switzerland, too, 
French-speakers are regarded as more open to Europe and the world, and more in favor of social 
redistribution as well as state intervention, than German speakers (Bühlmann and Caroni, 2013; 
Linder, Zürcher and Bolliger, 2008, p. 63 and 186).  
The contrast becomes even stronger when comparing Berne canton (predominantly German-
speaking and Protestant) with Jura canton (predominantly French-speaking and Catholic). For 
example, at the federal parliamentary elections of 2011 (elected using proportionality), in Jura the 
Christian-Democrats came first, with 33.2% of the vote, followed by the Socialists, with 30.8%. In 
                                                          
3 We are well aware that the strongest welfare states in Europe exist in predominantly Protestant 
countries (as in Scandinavia), but individual-level evidence from cross-national surveys indicates that 
religious Catholics are more collectivist than religious Protestants (see Burnham 1967,Davis and 
Robinson 2012). One pillar of strong Scandinavian welfare states is their powerful trade unions, 
which is not primarily due to the collectivist attitudes of Protestants, but rather to the adoption of 
institutions like the Ghent system for the distribution of welfare benefits in these countries (Hechter, 
2004). 
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Berne, by contrast, the national-conservative People’s party came first, with 29%, followed by the 
center-right party BDP, with 14.9% (BFS, 2015). Also note that, particularly with regard to social 
welfare, Swiss Christian-Democrats have moved to the left, while right-wing parties are staunchly 
pro-market (Fossati and Häusermann, 2014, p. 598f.). Accordingly, in Armingeon et al.’s (2004, p. 35) 
classification of cantonal “worlds of welfare”, Berne belongs to the liberal-conservative type whereas 
Jura is predominantly social-democratic. 
According to our theory, ecological factors can either enhance or detract from this effect of 
cultural legacies on political preferences. When ecology serves as a barrier to intra-group interaction, 
the effect of cultural legacies on political preferences is attenuated. For example, a mountain range 
may cut off an otherwise homogenous territory and produce separate ways of life and political 
preferences. Likewise, due to residential sorting, people born in the same city may have opposite 
political preferences based on exactly where they live in it (Cox, 2002, p. 148). However, when 
ecology facilitates intra-group interaction, the effect of cultural legacies is reinforced. Research on 
cross-border regions confirms that “physical proximity […] has less to do with pure distance 
measured in kilometers between different actors, than with the efforts it takes for them to interact 
in terms of time and costs” (Lundquist and Trippl, 2013, p. 53). Related to proximity are more 
material and practical concerns, including economies of scale and spillover effects, for example job 
opportunities (in public administration in Delémont, which would grow and become more influential 
in an expanded Jura), and exposure to common news outlets (ibid.). 
Once political preferences have been formed, our model predicts that people then act based 
on those preferences, given ecological constraints. In our case, it is statist preferences that primarily 
shape the decision to secede. When current state policy is largely congruent with the values of 
particular cultural groups, these groups can be considered to be more or less politically satisfied, and 
they are therefore oriented toward the status quo and non-secession. But when state policies are at 
variance with the preferences of cultural groups, then some political tension is bound to occur 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). Hence, when afforded the opportunity to choose, as in secession 
referenda, cultural groups will prefer to be ruled by those who share their values rather than by the 
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representatives of groups espousing different values, all else equal. Being ruled by those with 
different preferences about the role of government can be perceived as alien rule and therefore 
considered to be illegitimate (Hechter, 2013). It is illegitimate not only because it violates the 
pervasive norm of collective self-determination (as advanced, for example, in the United Nations 
Charter), but also because the former group usually suffers from suboptimal governance at the hands 
of alien rulers. Hence, minority language groups typically desire state recognition of their language; 
members of minority religions claim the same as regards their faith, and so forth. This kind of 
demand lies at the heart of all nationalist and secessionist movements (Hechter, 2000). Hence, were 
it given the choice, every distinctive cultural group should prefer to be ruled by its own kind rather 
than by cultural aliens. Indeed, ethnic voting around the world is pervasive, especially in 
multinational African and Asian countries, but also in Europe. The first elections in Bosnia in 1990, for 
example, were deemed “indistinguishable from an ethnic census” (Bieber, 2006, Table 2.7). Many 
elections around the world are similar, even in societies that are not war-torn.  
Next we apply this theoretical model to the case of Jurassic separatism. 
 
Why Jura Bernois chose not to secede 
On 24 November 2013, a majority of 72% in the Jura Bernois region of Switzerland voted to remain in 
the Canton of Berne. With an average turnout of 76% across the 49 municipalities concerned, and 
one even attaining 97%, people clearly cared enough to vote on this issue.4 The outcome of the 
referendum revealed that people value the status quo, in which they are a tiny linguistic minority of 
6% in a large canton with 900,000 inhabitants, over one in which they would have been a substantial 
religious minority of 42% in a medium-sized canton of 120,000 inhabitants after unification. This begs 
the question: why was religious homophily with the rest of Berne more important for Jura Bernois 
                                                          
4 Since in Switzerland every citizen entitled to vote is registered automatically, these turnout figures 
refer to the share of votes cast from among all eligible voters. 
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than linguistic homophily with Jura, when joining Jura would have increased the group’s relative size, 
and presumably its political influence?  
Once we take into account the history of Switzerland, the puzzle becomes even more 
intriguing. When the Swiss polity was reshaped in the wake of the Napoleonic wars during the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815, several of the pre-1798 cantonal powers were restored, but with 
significantly reduced territorial borders. This was particularly the case for Canton Berne, whose 
extensive territorial losses to the North and South were compensated by awarding it the former 
Prince-Bishopric of Basel in its North-West, on the border with France (Mueller, 2013, p. 94). 
Following a history of post-WWII political mobilization, leading up to a referendum cascade at the 
regional, district and local levels between 1974 and 1975, the predominantly French-speaking and 
Catholic region in very North-West of that area seceded from the predominantly German-speaking 
and Protestant canton of Berne to form the canton of Jura (Laponce, 2012, pp. 124-126; see also 
Jenkins, 1986). Yet the Jura Bernois region chose to remain part of Berne rather than join the new 
canton of Jura in 1974 (Crevoisier, 2012). Despite this initial rejection, the architects of the new 
canton of Jura continued to campaign for a unified French speaking canton (Pichard, 2004; 
Rennwald, 1995; Ganguillet, 1998).  
After 40 years of political struggle, the elite of Jura managed to hold a new referendum on 
the unification of Francophones in Jura Bernois and Jura Canton (Schumacher, 2005). The 2013 
referendum took place in the two areas, Jura canton and Jura Bernois, and asked whether voters in 
these two regions wanted to initiate a process whereby a draft constitution for the entire French-
speaking region of the former Prince-Bishopric would be launched. If accepted in both areas, the first 
step toward (re)uniting the two territories into a French-speaking canton of their own would have 
been taken. However, the plan was decisively rejected by the francophone Protestants in Jura 
Bernois. Although 75% of the voters in Jura canton supported the idea of receiving Jura Bernois, 72% 
of the voters in Jura Bernois voted against leaving Berne for Jura. Figure 2 displays the share of “yes” 
votes across the two regions, North (Jura) and South (Jura Bernois), and across the 106 
municipalities, the lowest level at which referendum data are available. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of “yes”-votes in the 2013 referendum, Jura and Jura Bernois 
 
Imagine for a moment that the referendum had passed and the two entities became united. 
The current majority in Jura Bernois, the French-speaking Protestants, would have become a religious 
minority in a reunited territory, while the French-speaking Catholics would have retained their 
majority position in both religious and linguistic terms. Clearly, then, unification would have been a 
better deal in this respect for Jura than for Jura Bernois, and this is likely part of the reason why the 
former voted 75% in favor of unifying, whereas only 28% voted for unification in the latter. That said, 
Jura Bernois is still a linguistic minority in Berne canton, and therefore the question remains why an 
overwhelming majority in Jura Bernois revealed their preference to be ruled by a linguistically rather 
than a religiously alien group. 
One reason for this might be that language is constitutionally protected in Switzerland, with 
its territorial borders fixed by both cantonal and federal law (Richter, 2005, p. 159), in a way that 
religion is not (cf. also Brubaker, 2013). But even so, this would not explain intra-regional variation – 
of the 49 communes in Jura Bernois,5 approval ranged from 2% to 55% (see also Table A1, in the 
Annex). On the culturalist view, since Jura is French-speaking and Catholic, the municipalities of Jura 
Bernois that had more Catholics and French speakers should favor seceding and joining Jura, as this 
would have resulted in native rule on both cultural dimensions. Further, if religion were more salient 
than language, then the two Catholic groups (French- and German-speaking Catholics) should be the 
most and second most in favor of joining Jura, followed by the two Protestant groups (French- and 
German-speaking). The Protestants should be the least in favor of joining Jura, since neither would 
want to be ruled by an alien cultural group. If language was more salient than religion, then we 
should observe the French-speakers, whether Protestant or Catholic, being more in favor of 
                                                          
5 The lowest political-administrative level in Switzerland is formed by communes, used here 
synonymously with local government and municipalities. 
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secession from Berne than the German-speakers of both religions. However, if neither language nor 
religion by themselves are important predictors of secession, but operate through political 
preferences and are constrained by ecological factors, then the models incorporating political and 
ecological factors should better predict the 2013 vote. This leads us to three primary hypotheses on 
cultural legacies, political preferences and ecological constraints: 
 
H1: Municipalities with more French-speakers and more Catholics are more likely to vote in 
favor of seceding from Berne. 
H2: Municipalities with more statist political preferences are more likely to vote in favor of 
seceding from Berne.  
H3: Municipalities more proximate to the capital of Jura canton (Delémont) are more likely to 
vote in favor of seceding from Berne.  
 
After discussing our case selection in the next section, we operationalize and test these 
hypotheses. 
 
Why Switzerland? 
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is worth discussing the logic and limits of our case selection. 
Although there are important differences between internal and external secessions – especially the 
greater amount of risk-aversion involved in an external secession (Nadeau, Blais and Carty, 1999) – 
there are three good reasons why testing our theory in this particular setting might be instructive. 
The first concerns the ostensibly clear distinction between internal and external secession, which we 
think has been sometimes exaggerated (Simeon, 2009; Gilliland, 2012). On the one hand, secession in 
Western Europe rarely entails full independence. Most separatist movements do not seek total 
separation, but desire to remain in multinational governance units like the European Union, the 
European Monetary Union or NATO (Sorens, 2012). On the other hand, federal states usually are 
characterized by autonomous regions that produce similar kinds of public goods that nation-states 
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produce elsewhere. Such is the case for the Swiss cantons: they have their own government, 
parliament, and courts as  well as power over police, taxes, education, transport, health care and 
social services, to name but the most important areas (Vatter, 2014). This significantly blurs the line 
between external and internal secession, and suggests that lessons learned from the study of internal 
secessions can speak to our understanding of external secessions (such as in Scotland). 
Second, moving the analysis from the cross-national to the sub-national level increases the 
number of cases to be compared (Snyder, 2001). This is an important consideration for theory 
development, since there are only so many referenda on secession that have been allowed to take 
place (Qvortrup, 2014). Further, this kind of sub-national analysis affords researchers with 
considerable variation on the dependent variable (voting for secession) without having to control for 
numerous potential causal factors that differ across countries (Lijphart, 1971). 
The third and final reason for studying the case of Jura Bernois is perhaps the most important 
theoretically. Overlapping identities in Jura Bernois – its majority population is French-speaking, as in 
the canton to be joined, but also Protestant, as in the canton to which it currently belongs – provide 
us with an excellent opportunity to investigate a crucial debate in the study of identity politics. In this 
case of cross-cutting cleavages, we can parse out the relative importance of language, “a pervasive, 
inescapable medium of social interaction” (Brubaker, 2013, p. 5), and religion, a key determinant of 
values and enduring political preferences (Jordan, 2014) and short-term voting behavior (Goldberg, 
2014; Rapp et al., 2014). The people of Jura Bernois are faced with a choice between belonging to a 
political entity in which they are a linguistic minority or another in which they are a religious 
minority.  
 
Analysis 
To test our theory as well as its alternatives, we have merged census with referendum and other 
political and socio-economic data. Since the focus of this article is on secession rather than 
irredentism, our analysis will be confined to the political behavior in Jura Bernois. Hence, our 
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dependent variable is the proportion of approving voters (yes votes) in a given municipality in the 
November 2013 referendum, which is drawn from the official website of the Government of Berne.6 
As Figure 3 shows, there is considerable variation in the aggregate percentage in favor of unification 
in Jura Bernois, with one municipality – the regional capital, Moutier – narrowly approving and one 
other municipality – neighboring Belprahon – resulting in a tie. Data for all independent and control 
variables were aggregated to the level of municipalities as of November 2013 to make them 
compatible (for descriptive statistics, see Table A1 in the Annex). 
 
Figure 3: Share of yes votes in Jura Bernois, 2013 
 
To evaluate the straightforward culturalist explanation based on linguistic and religious 
homophily, we measure the proportion of French-speakers, Catholics and French-speaking Catholics 
in each municipality. Since Jura Bernois was deciding on whether to leave a largely German-
Protestant canton (Berne) for a predominantly French-Catholic one (Jura), on this view the more 
members of each of these groups in each municipality, the more it should be in favor of separation 
from Berne. To calculate the share of the respective groups in a municipality, we used the census 
data from 2000, the last year in which all residents were assessed by the Federal Office for Statistics 
(BFS). 
If cultural identities have enduring effects, and people carry their preferences with them to 
their new voting municipalities, then migration patterns should influence the vote. Since according to 
the cultural theory French-Catholics should be most in favor of merging Jura Bernois with Jura, we 
would expect those municipalities with the most French-Catholic immigration to be most in favor of 
joining Jura. To calculate increases in that group’s population size in each municipality, we subtracted 
census data from 2000 from 1970 census data (source: BFS, 1970 and 2000).  
                                                          
6 Cf. http://www.sta.be.ch/sta/de/index/wahlen-abstimmungen/wahlen-abstimmungen.html (last 
accessed in December 2014). 
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To investigate the (economic) rationalist approach to secession, we examine pocketbook and 
social class issues. If people prefer to pay lower taxes and regard pocketbook issues as an important 
basis for their political decisions, then this should also be reflected in the 2013 referendum. To test 
this hypothesis, we rely on the local tax coefficients using the Government of Berne’s financial report 
(Finanzverwaltung des Kantons Bern, 2013). The local tax coefficient measures how much citizens in 
each municipality pay in addition to cantonal and federal taxes. Because local governments can 
autonomously decide on their tax coefficient, and because they are in competition with one another, 
coefficients are in principle set as low as possible. But only those municipalities that can afford to do 
so will have a low coefficient. Local tax coefficients are thus a measure of local wealth: the higher the 
tax coefficient, the poorer the local government. If this logic is accurate, we would expect that 
municipalities with higher tax coefficients should be more in favor of unification: Horowitz (1981; 
1985) has shown that poorer regions are early and frequent secessionists, whereas advanced regions 
are late and rare secessionists. By contrast, Ayres and Saideman (2000) fail to find any relationship 
between economic differentials and secession. Sorens (2012) claims that the relationship depends on 
regime type—“in democracies, economically better off regions are more secessionist…in autocracies, 
this relationship could be weaker or non-existent.” However, since all the communes under 
investigation here are part of the same democratic polity, that last point can be ignored, for the 
moment. 
To test the idea that subordinate social status will produce political salience of that cultural 
marker – and thereby shape the vote –, we create a class variable for each of the four cultural groups 
(French-Catholics, French-Protestants, German-Catholics and German-Protestants). We use Oesch’s 
(2006) classification (cf. also Oesch and Rennwald, 2010), which combines educational attainment, 
employment (ISCO codes) and employment status. The variable is then collapsed into three 
categories: upper (including Oesch’s large employers, self-employed professionals, technical experts, 
higher-grade managers and administrators, and sociocultural professionals), middle (petite 
bourgeoisie with and without employees, technicians, skilled crafts, associate managers and 
administrators, skilled office, sociocultural semi-professionals, and skilled service), and lower class 
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(routine operatives, routine agriculture, routine office, and routine service). Classes are calculated on 
the basis of the 2000 census data. We then subtract the value for French-Catholics from that of 
German-Protestants in each municipality. Class-based arguments imply that municipalities where 
French-Catholics are subordinate to German-Protestants should express a greater desire to join Jura.  
Finally, scholars have long emphasized how spatial factors, especially distance between 
peoples, shape network structures, identities and preferences (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan and 
Urwin, 1983; Jenkins, 1986; Rutherford et al., 2014), and this is also true in the case of Jura; indeed, it 
was the focus of the first systematic study of the Jurassien question (Jenkins, 1986). To measure 
distance, we calculated travel distance to Delémont (the capital of Jura) by car in minutes using 
Google maps (2014). The variable was then recoded (46, the maximum, minus travel time) so that 
higher values denote proximity to Delémont. As mentioned above, the point of this variable is to 
capture the potential for communication as a facilitator for common ideas, norms and preferences – 
and all of that with regard to the political capital of Jura canton, the future “core” if Jura Bernois had 
seceded.7 
Turning to the measurement of the indicators implied by our own theory, we emphasize how 
cultural identities (language and religion) shape political preferences, particularly in the domain of 
statism. To measure statist preferences, we use two indicators. The first is a measure of voting for 
left-wing parties in the last cantonal elections at local level (30 March 2014). Both the Social-
Democrats (PS) and the Parti Socialiste Autonome (PSA) were classified as left-wing parties.8 Our 
second indicator of statist preferences is the share of people having voted in favor of gun control in 
the 13 February 2011 federal referendum. The popular initiative on which people voted that day, if 
approved, would have forbidden Swiss army members (technically, all Swiss men above 18 years) to 
                                                          
7 Our results do not change substantially if we use distance from Biel, capital of the Lake district of 
Canton Bern, instead (results available on request), or the shortest distance to the border of Jura. 
8 Cf. http://www.sta.be.ch/sta/de/index/wahlen-abstimmungen/wahlen-
abstimmungen/wahlen/wahlen_2014.html. 
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store their personal weapon at home when not in service (sources: BFS, 2011).9 The right to bear 
arms is probably as sacred in Switzerland as it is in the United States, and thus a referendum on this 
issue is a good proxy for individual preferences for a larger or smaller role for government more 
generally (cf. Bühlmann and Caroni, 2013, for a similar approach). These political preferences, 
together with ecological factors, shaped the decision to secede. If our theory is true, then we should 
see municipalities in Jura Bernois having more statist preferences and those closer to the center of 
Jura being more in favor of seceding from Berne.10 
 
Table 1: SUR Results of the cross-sectional analysis (Jura Bernois) 
 
We adopt a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach because it captures our two-
stage theoretical argument (displayed above, Figure 1) better than a single equation model.11 SUR is 
a two-stage generalization of the general linear regression model (Zellner, 1962; Zellner and Ando, 
2010). The first stage in an SUR is an OLS regression, the second uses the residuals from the first to 
estimate the elements of the matrix, Σ, via (feasible) generalized least squares regression, and the 
error terms are assumed to be correlated across the equations (Amemiya, 1985, p. 198). 
In the first stage, we predict political preferences as a function of cultural factors (language 
and religion), and in the second we predict the vote on secession as a function of political and 
ecological factors. The model can be written down in matrix form as follows (Zellner and Ando, 
2010): y = Xβ + u, u ~ N(0, Ω ⊗  I), where N(µ, Σ) denotes the normal distribution with mean µ and 
covariance matrix Σ, ⊗  is the tensor product, Ω is an m × m symmetric matrix with diagonal elements 
{ω1
2,…, ωm
2}, and the off-diagonal ijth elements are ωij, y′ = (y′1,…,y′m), X = diag{X1,…,Xm}, β′ = 
                                                          
9 Cf. http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20110213/index.html  
10 Since individual votes are unavailable, and we would not wish to commit an ecological 
fallacy, our analysis and inferences are cast at the municipal level throughout.  
11 However, the results of the OLS regressions are reported in Table A2 in the Annex.  
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(β′1,…,β′m) and u′ = (u′1, ..., u′m). Under the assumption of symmetric error distributions, the 
estimator produces unbiased coefficients and standard errors in small samples. 
Table 1 presents our main results. The first equation predicts political preferences on the 
basis of cultural factors, the second uses those political preferences, along with ecological factors, to 
predict the secession vote. Across all four model specifications, the results indicate that cultural 
factors (religion and language) help account for variation in political preferences over statism. These 
effects are strong and consistent across the models, and show that municipalities with more 
Catholics and French-speakers were much more likely than municipalities with  fewer Catholics and 
French-speakers to vote for leftist parties promoting more statism.  
In the Jura vote equation, we find that these political preferences for statism (both in the 
form of left-wing voting and on a referendum vote over gun control) are highly predictive. Those 
municipalities that voted more for leftist parties and more for gun control were much more likely to 
vote to secede from Berne and join Jura. Ecological effects were also important—municipalities 
closer to Delémont (the capital of Jura) expressed a much stronger desire to secede. This effect 
appears to be both additive and interactive. In models 1 and 2, we find evidence for an additive 
effect of proximity above and beyond the effect of political preferences. In models 3 and 4, we 
investigate an interactive effect, and find evidence for an interaction between proximity and left 
voting, but not for an interaction between proximity and gun control. In sum, models 1-2 and models 
3-4 provide evidence for a significant joint effect on the decision to secede.  
All of these models also provide reasonably tight fits to the data. R2 numbers for the Jura 
vote equation all hover around 70% of the variance explained, and the figures for the first equation 
predicting the left vote reach a high of 47% (model 1) and have a low of 35% (model 2). While Table 1 
and Table A2 represent different approaches to estimating the parameters implied in the conceptual 
model, both methods bring us to a similar conclusion about the role of cultural, political and 
ecological factors in shaping the decision to secede in Jura. 
Figure 4 displays the marginal effects of these statist preferences, along with proximity, on 
the yes-vote. To get a sense of the range (Figure 2), recall that the minimum level of support for 
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secession was 2% (Seehof), the maximum was 55% (Moutier), and the average was about 25% (La 
Neuveville). An increase in the proportion in favor of more state control over guns from 0% to 60% 
can be expected to increase the yes-vote from 10% to 35%, whereas an increase in the strength of 
left-wing parties from 0% to 50% leads to an increase in the yes-vote from about 11% to 40%. An 
increase in proximity to Delémont from 50 down to 0 minutes is associated with an increase in the 
yes-vote from about 8% to 40%. 
 
Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Gun Control voting, Left-wing voting and Proximity 
 
To conclude, at least in Jura Bernois the vote seems to have been about which alien ruler was 
preferable based on statist political preferences: a linguistically identical but religiously alien one 
(Jura canton) or a religiously similar but linguistically alien one (Berne canton). The citizens of Jura 
Bernois overwhelmingly voted to remain in Berne and not to join Jura. Why did Jura Bernois choose 
not to secede? We suggest that it was not because of religious homophily with Berne, nor because of 
purely pocketbook cost-benefit calculations, but because Berne offered better conditions for the 
realization of Jura Bernois’ political preferences – in this case, less statism. 
What implications do these results have for cultural, rationalist and structuralist accounts of 
separatism? This story of (non)secession, like many others around the world, has important elements 
of both the politics of identity and the politics of interest. Whereas a basic model with cultural 
variables alone (model 1) shows that municipalities with more French-speakers and more Catholics 
were significantly more likely to vote to secede, that model only explains 42% of the variance. 
Similarly, a straightforward rationalist model provides for about 22 % of the explained variance, and 
a simple ecological model (not reported) explains 19% of the variance on its own. Our model, which 
shows that ecological factors and political preferences mattered for how people voted on secession, 
explains 67% of the observed variance – about 25% more than the next best model.  
To investigate a further implication of our theory, we examine the extent to which the effect 
of political preferences mediates the influence of cultural identities. We conducted four Sobel tests 
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(1982) to quantify the possible mediation effects – that is, the extent to which the cultural effects of 
religion and language are mediated by our hypothesized mechanisms through statist preferences. 
Our results indicate that the strength of left-wing parties mediates a full 72% of the effect of 
language and 47% of the effect of religion on the vote. These very large mediation effects lend strong 
support to the notion that the effect of cultural identities is transmitted through political preferences 
over statism. The mediation effect of our second indicator of statist preferences – gun control – has a 
weaker effect: preferences for gun control mediate only 5% of the effect of language and 13% of the 
effect of religion on the vote. This could be because gun control merely captures one aspect of 
statism, namely a security vs. trust trade-off, whereas left-wing parties stand for a whole range of 
economic and progressive form of statism – child care, tax breaks for the poor, education, 
infrastructure investments, environment, unemployment benefits, health care, and culture. 
Finally, our results also indicate that geography matters. Proximity to the capital of Jura 
(Delémont) is statistically significant in all of the estimated models, which underpins the importance 
of ecology in this decision. But rather than regarding distance as a supporting factor of secession in 
itself, we think this result is best interpreted as a factor that enhances or undercuts the effect of 
political preferences. We now conclude by summarizing our findings and drawing more general 
implications. 
 
Conclusion 
This study has highlighted the advantages of combining cultural, rational and structural accounts of 
secession. It shows that each alone provides a less persuasive account than the alternative advanced 
here, and the empirical evidence bears this out. Specifically, in our case Catholicism and French 
language confer distinct political preferences for more statism, which strongly predicted the yes vote 
on the secession of Jura Bernois from Berne Canton. Adding ecological factors to this model 
improved it further. The 2013 referendum was less about identity as such, or about classic 
pocketbook issues, and more about whether Berne or Jura would be better able to satisfy Jura 
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Bernois’ preference for less statism. On the evidence of the vote, Berne was preferred by 72% of 
voters.  
What have we learned that is of general interest to scholars of secession? First, far from 
being mutually exclusive, cultural, rational and structural logics can go hand in hand. Indeed, they 
need one another because culture can explain the origins of political preferences, through distinct 
cultural legacies, and structural factors constrain the effects of political preferences on collective 
action and decision-making, while rational choice can explain what people choose on the basis of 
those preferences. All else equal, people prefer to be ruled by their own kind, and if that is not 
possible they will chose the less alien of two alien rulers. 
Second, the factors responsible for the political salience of different identities in multicultural 
societies may hinge on how these identities shape distinct political preferences for either more or 
less statism. That political preferences about statism trump cultural identity per se is a far cry from 
conventional expectations about the durability and salience of religious and linguistic distinctions in 
the literature on secession. In our case, identity only matters for secession via the specific political 
preferences that it entails.  
Last, ecology matters in helping to reinforce or undercut distinct preferences among distinct 
cultural groups. Certain topographies facilitate contact with certain groups while obstructing 
relations with others. Thus territory matters symbolically, by creating symbols of identification (“our 
land” – note that the flag of Jura canton features seven stripes in memory of the seven districts of 
the former arch-bishopric, three of which form today’s Jura Bernois), as well as practically, by 
exposing people to the same news outlets whose circulation (newspapers) or reach (radio, TV) is 
necessarily limited; offering jobs within reasonable commuting times; and by creating “trust and 
codes of conduct, and shared organisational and technological cultures for collaboration and 
knowledge exchange” (Lundqvist and Trippl, 2013, p. 53).  
If we try to generalize from this case, that Quebec is a French-speaking island in a sea of 
English-speakers certainly helped its claim for full independence  – the referenda in 1980 and 1995 
both failed, even if the second time the “no” vote won by less than 1%. Given Quebec’s unique 
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linguistic and religious legacies, overwhelmingly Francophone and Roman Catholic, a legacy of 
colonial settlement policies, a new referendum on the independence of Quebec may be merely a 
matter of time. Similar considerations on the actual content and level of public service delivery, and 
not so much the ethnic underpinning of the polity itself, have played a role in Scotland. However, as 
external and internal referenda are not completely comparable, our findings must await validation in 
a high-stakes external secession referendum. 
In conclusion, secession and referenda on secession are on the rise in Europe. The case of 
Jura Bernois has highlighted many of the same issues that arise in other cases of secession, namely 
group identity, political preferences over the role of the state and geography, and the excellent 
empirical evidence in this study has enabled us to test rival explanations of secession in a way that is 
rarely possible. Nevertheless, assessing the external validity of the proposed theoretical model 
remains an important task for future research.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: SUR Results of the cross-sectional analysis (Jura Bernois) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
Jura Vote Equation 
% Left Wing Voters .62***(.12) .63***(.12) .41(.36) .62***(.12) % Pro gun control .34***(.10) .33***(.10) .32***(.10) .38*(.23) Proximity to Delémont .48***(.08) .48***(.08) .27(.36) .55*(.32) Left X Proximity   .01(.01)  Guns X Proximity    -.00(.00) Age -.66(.48) -.68(.48) -.64(.48) -.65(.48) Tax Coefficient -2.93(5.23) -2.93(5.23) -2.83(5.21) -2.67(5.32) CDL 1.87(2.26) 1.87(2.26) 1.38(2.39) 1.91(2.26) N 49 49 49 49 AIC 664.31 669.85 665.96 666.30 BIC 688.90 692.55 692.44 692.79 R2 .68 .68 .69 .68 RMSE 5.99 5.99 5.96 5.98 
Left Vote Equation 
%Catholics .18*(.09)  .280**(.109) .18*(.10) %French speakers .20***(.06)  .156**(.074) .20***(.06) % French Catholic  .32***(.11)   Age 1.43**(.48) 1.78**(.49) 1.071**(.522) 1.43***(.48) Tax coefficient  -1.58(5.94) -1.10(6.33) -2.77(6.36) -1.58(5.94) CDL -.52(2.66) 1.72(2.60) -1.111(4.255) -.51(2.66) N 49 49 49 49 AIC 664.31 669.85 665.96 666.30 BIC 688.90 692.55 692.44 692.79 R2 .55 .47 .55 .55 RMSE 6.61 7.15 6.61 6.61 Note: SUR regressions; Beta coefficients with SEs in brackets;.* = p<.1, ** = p<.05, *** = p<.01. 
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Figure 1: Two-Stage Theoretical Model 
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Figure 2: Distribution of “yes”-votes in the 2013 referendum, Jura and Jura Bernois 
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Figure 3: Share of yes votes in Jura Bernois, 201 
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Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Left-wing Voting (top), Gun Control voting (middle) and Proximity (bottom) 
 
 
 
Note: The y-axis depicts the proportion of voters that voting for secession. X-axis in the top graph depicts the 
proportion of the population that voted for Left-wing parties. X-axis in the middle graph depicts the 
proportion of the population that voted in favor of a referendum to have more state control over guns. The 
X-axis in the bottom graph depicts the distance to Delémont from each municipality.
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Annex 
Table A1: Variable descriptions 
Variable Description N Min Max Mean SD 
%In favor of 
joining Jura 
share of pro-JU voters in 
November 2013 referendum 49 2.44 55.36 25.16 10.73 
%Catholics share of Catholics in 2000 49 3.70 58.99 25.83 11.39 
%French 
speakers share of F-speakers in 2000 49 8.86 95.65 79.58 20.56 
%French 
Catholic 
share of F-speaking Catholics 
(2000) 49 0.00 54.50 20.50 10.85 
%Left Wing 
Voters 
share of left-wing parties last 
cantonal elections (PS+PSA)+ 49 0.00 44.70 27.54 9.96 
%Pro gun 
control 
%yes to the weapons' control 
initiative (February 2011) 49 6.90 59.48 37.55 10.31 
%Catholics  x 
Proximity Cshare2000 * toDel 49 0.00 2536.57 707.23 561.61 
%French 
speakers x 
Proximity 
Fshare2000 * toDel 49 0.00 4112.95 2080.64 1225.90 
Left X 
Proximity LEFT * toDel 49 0.00 1801.71 719.72 487.20 
Guns X 
Proximity yesweapons * toDel 49 0.00 2285.88 950.84 540.60 
Proximity to 
Delémont 
proximity to Delémont (46 -
travel time by car) 49 0 46 26.16 12.48 
Increase in  
%French 
Catholic 
prop increase F-Cat 1970 to 
2000 49 -7.16 18.01 7.13 5.66 
Age mean age of LG (2000) 49 30.84 42.87 39.26 2.43 
Tax coefficient local tax rate in 2013 49 1.50 2.28 1.90 .17 
CDL 
Cultural division of labor, 
measured as the average 
difference in class (mean of 
German-Protestants minus 
mean of French-Catholics)++ 
49 -2.10 .28 -.31 .45 
 
Notes: +values for the municipalities that have merged on 1 January 2014 have been imputed 
from the merged commune; ++as there were no French-speaking Catholics in Seehof and 
Schelten in 2000, we have assumed a value of 0 for them. 
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Table A2: OLS Results of the cross-sectional analysis (Jura Bernois) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
B(SE) VIF B(SE) VIF B(SE) VIF B(SE) VIF 
culturalist 
% Catholics .179 (.121) 1.362     
-.058 
(.114) 1.88 
% French-speakers .147** (.065) 1.294     
.035 
(.068) 2.19 
% increase in French-Catholics .352 (.248) 1.412     
.238 
(.211) 1.59 
statism 
% Left-wing voters     
.550*** 
(.103) 1.24 
.484*** 
(.138) 2.10 
% pro gun control     
.296** 
(.103) 1.33 
.307** 
(.114) 1.53 
ecological  Proximity to Delémont .339***  (.098) 1.064 
.451*** (.114) 1.10 .456*** (.077) 1.08 .459*** (.090) 1.39 
rationalist  
tax coefficient   
2.20 (8.112) 1.08   -1.578 (6.127) 1.19 
CDL   
6.57** (3.112) 1.02   -.201 (2.730) 1.70 
R2 0.467 .279 .668 .687 
Adj. R2 0.419 .230 .645 .624 
(RMSE) 8.179 9.413 6.392 6.583 
N 49 49 49 49 
Note: OLS regressions; Beta coefficients with SEs in brackets; VIF = Variance Inflation Factor.* = p<.1, ** = p<.05, *** = p<.01. 
 
